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Microblogging has a special appeal not only to Internet users in China who are 
keen to voice their opinions in a fast and easy way, but also to Chinese rulers who see 
microblogging sites as a giant magnetic field for them to tap into, to mold and to 
“supervise” public opinions. In fact, since the 1980s, “public opinion supervision” has 
been on the agenda of the Chinese Communist Party (the Party) by the People’s 
Republic of China (China). It is a term specifically coined by the Party in the 1980s to 
describe the mobilization of citizen awareness and opinion by the media to check 
against the deleterious force in the state under the guidance of the Party.
1
 In such 
process, the media plays an indispensable role as a state agent, acting between the 
authorities and the citizens.  
But by the time of the 21
st
 century, Web 2.0 has completely changed the above 
dynamics. Armed with the Internet, public opinion has evolved into a powerful 
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赵紫阳在中国共产党第十三次全国代表大会上的报告 [Zhao Ziyang, Report Delivered at the 13th 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China] (October 25, 1987), available at, 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64566/65447/4526369.html. 
 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2397060 
2 
 
phenomenon with a life of its own coming from the netizens, reining free from the 
shackles of Party’s supervision, with every potential to be a genuine form of public 
opinion monitoring from the mass. Because of the Internet, the public, the Party and 
the media have to face new challenges and assume new roles. The public has become 
an active group of netizens, eager to voice their opinions but cautious not to overstep 
the boundaries. On the other hand, the Party is eager to control the Internet,
2
 but also 
willing to use the Internet as a safety valve to release frustration among its citizens in 
a careful manner.
3
 In between, the Internet has inherited the role of the media since 
the days of commercialization in the 1980s in pleasing two masters and attaining two 
seemingly conflicting two goals: to avoid offending the Party and to please the 
market.
4
  
The Internet in China has been rightly pointed out to be an arena of intense 
struggle, full of complex dynamics, participatory and contentious in nature.
5
 And the 
above complex and contradictory relationship is pronounced in legal disputes, posing 
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 Gary King, Jennifer Pan and Margaret E. Roberts, How Censorship in China Allows Government 
Criticism but Silences Collective Expression, American Political Science Review (2013); David 
Bamman, Brendan O’Connor, and Noah A. Smith, Censorship and Deletion Practices in Chinese 
Social Media, 17:3 First Monday (2012). 
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 Jonathan Hassid, Safety Valve or Pressure Cooker? Blogs in Chinese Political Life, 62 JOURNAL OF 
COMMUNICATION 212 (2012). 
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 Though this is not expressly stated in the law, the elaborate license system and framework have 
rendered private ownership almost impossible. Hence, strictly speaking, there remains no independent 
press in China as individually owned or civilian organized newspapers are not allowed. Rather, China’s 
print media is largely divided into Party and non-Party organs. For discussion of the background, see 
Perry Keller, Privilege and Punishment: Press Governance in China, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 87, 
99, 100-101 (2003).  See中华人民共和国新闻出版总署, 报纸出版管理规定第 32号 [General 
Administration of Press and Publication, Provisions on the Administration of Newspaper Publication, 
Order No. 32], promulgated Sept. 20, 2005, effective Dec.1, 2005, available at 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2006/content_375808.htm.  
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 GUOBIN YANG, THE POWER OF THE INTERNET IN CHINA 2 (2008). 
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new challenges to the judiciary. Like the Internet, the judiciary is in fact an 
intermediary caught in-between the Party and the public. But unlike the Internet, the 
judiciary is a state organ under the Party. Recalling the earlier definition of public 
opinion supervision, the judiciary is the state organ that is rightly under the diligent 
public scrutiny, exercised through the media (including the Internet), and accountable 
to the Party. If any alleged call of miscarriage of justice reaches alarming level, the 
judiciary is likely to bear the brunt of such grievances.
6
 As a result, judges in China 
have to shoulder the double burden of public opinion supervision by the Party and 
public opinion monitoring by the public.  
As will be discussed later in this article, we will see that netizens are eager to 
restore justice in society. Through the mobilization of public opinions online and 
offline, media trials were held to condemn or rescue suspects. Not only were disputes 
managed to be heard by the court but trials were rerun and sentences rewritten by 
judges. Hence, public opinion has been roaming wildly on the Internet, and creeping 
into the court rooms.  
  However, relying on public opinion supervision/monitoring and Internet trials is 
a risky endeavour to achieve populist justice. Seemingly, justice may have been 
restored when officials are condemned and the underdogs are rescued. The Internet is 
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hailed once again as the frontier and forum for free speech. But scholars have warned 
that when legal disputes and cases are being sensationalized and dramatized, the 
tension between justice and law has also been further antagonized in the authoritarian 
state of China and in a system where judicial independence is already weak.
7
  
While the above observation is certainly true, public opinion monitoring is 
essential at this juncture of China’s development before institutionalized judicial 
independence is being attained. This article focuses on the intricate relationship 
between the Party, the judiciary, the Internet and the netizens. It argues that the 
Internet has transformed public opinion supervision into a form a public opinion 
monitoring. The prowess of the netizens lies not in their ability to gather information 
but in being an active power to interpret, to associate and to transform the plight of 
their fellows into a legal narrative. Any argument of justice and any question of rights 
carry weight if they ultimately succeed in entering the judicial arena and in securing 
state intervention. One of the biggest challenges now, perhaps, is to ensure public 
opinion can be a form of monitoring, untainted by the supervision of the authorities. 
 
I. Methodology  
To capture the above dynamic, this study has chosen to analyze 12 legal stories 
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 Benjamin L. Liebman, The Media and the Courts: Towards Competitive Supervision? 208 CHINA 
QUARTERLY 833 (2011); Kaiju Chen and Xinhong Zhang, Trial by Media: Overcorrection of the 
Inadequacy of the Right to Free Speech in Contemporary China, 25 CRITICAL ARTS 46 (2011).  
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from the 100 events covered by the Office of Public Opinion Watch (OPOW) Reports 
between 2008 and 2012.
8
 Since 2008, the Office of Public Opinion Watch of People’s 
Daily Online has been issuing annual reports covering the top 20 Internet events in a 
particular year.
9
 This selection of online events is taken from the most popular 
discussion boards, blogs and microblogs of the year, including Tianya (天涯社區), 
Kaidi (凱迪社區 ), Qiangguo (強國論壇 ), Bullog (牛博網 ) and Sina Weibo 
(Microblog) (新浪微博). In order to be qualified as a significant event, it must have 
attracted a significant number of posts, and the threshold number changes every year 
to keep in pace with the rapid development of online discussion platforms. For 
instance, in 2008, an event had to attract more than 1100 posts but in 2012, the 
standard had become one million posts.
10
 In addition, the categories of different 
forms of expression being counted in the reports have also expanded from mainly 
online bulletin board discussion (BBS) to microblogging since 2010. 
The definition of a legal story in this study is a social conflict that could be 
successfully turned into a legal case being heard, a verdict being overturned, a 
sentence being changed, or a retrial being ordered by the courts due to the pressure of 
                                                 
8
 The selection of cases was done by the annual study of the Public Opinion Monitoring Unit of the 
People’s Online, a website operated by the official organ of the CCP. Results of the study have been 
published on the Annual Bluebook on Social Development edited by the Chinese Social Science 
Academy since 2008.  
9
 The People’s Daily Online (Renmin Wang, http://www.people.com.cn/) belongs to the Party Press, 
representing the official voice of the CCP. 
10
 The threshold tests to be the top most significant 20 Internet events were 1100, 
5,000,50,000,500,000,1 million posts respectively in the years of 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
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public opinion on the Internet. It is true that the OPOW reports have reflected only 
online discussion and, as later discussion will show, online public opinion often has to 
collaborate with traditional media to generate its impact. What is critical for our 
discussion is that such impact of public opinion is openly acknowledged by the courts 
or the authorities in relevant cases. 
Despite the small number of legal cases available, they are telling stories for 
qualitative study that enables us to understand how a grievance can be transformed 
into a judicial case, and how a case can evolve in the sentencing stage or how the final 
verdict be affected all due to the force of public opinion. In depth study will be carried 
out on four legal stories, in which large scale public survey was conducted by either 
the media or the court. 
The distribution of legal cases throughout the five years is shown in Table 1.
11
 
As we can see, there is a sudden and sharp rise of legal discussion in 2009 but a 
drastic drop to zero in 2012. 
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 The list of the legal cases can be found at Appendix 1. 
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Table 1: No. of Legal Cases Selected by the Public Opinion Watch Annual Report 
2008-12 
 
There is probably no definitive explanation for this trend. Conspiracy theory may 
point to censorship by the government in filtering out all legal cases and discussion in 
the post 2009 period. But an innocuous explanation of other competing events 
stealing the limelight is equally plausible. In fact, cases that had made it to the top 20 
lists were likely to be successful candidates that have beaten the censorship system. 
Studies have showed that censorship on microblogs and other social networking sites 
is massive in China.
12
 Sensitive keywords, like Tibet, Qinghai, Ai Weiwei and Liu 
Xiaobo, were filtered.
13
 While critical or negative comments against the authorities 
are tolerated, speech that advocates collective action is strictly curtailed.
14
 Our study 
                                                 
12
 Gary King, Jennifer Pan and Margaret E. Roberts, How Censorship in China Allows Government 
Criticism but Silences Collective Expression, American Political Science Review (2013); David 
Bamman, Brendan O’Connor, and Noah A. Smith, Censorship and Deletion Practices in Chinese 
Social Media, 17:3 First Monday (2012). 
13
 Bamman et al, id. 
14
 King et al, supra note 12. 
2  
8  
1  1  
0  
4 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
C
as
e
s 
Cases Listed in the Top 20 Hotest 
Issues on the Internet 
8 
 
also supports the above finding that none of the legal cases covered in the OPOW 
reports were related to controversies on sensitive keywords or related to collective 
action. 
 The puzzling issue then becomes what sort of conflicts would be controversial 
enough to capture public imagination, to generate large scale public interest, to cause 
the authorities to take actions but not to alarm them exceedingly to silence discussion. 
The answer seems to be hinging much on the interpretation of the power and use of 
public opinion by the authorities and by the citizens. 
 
II. Public Opinion Supervision vs. Public Opinion Monitoring 
“Public opinion supervision” (yulun jiandu 舆论监督) is a fluid and malleable 
term, with multi-layered meanings in the Chinese context.
15
 The authorities view it as 
a process of understanding the sentiments of the mass, with a duty to address their 
corresponding concerns, to hold the responsible officials responsible but all under the 
guidance and leadership of the Party. In contrast, the citizens tend to view it as their 
entitlement to express opinion to correct wrongs in society and to monitor those in 
power. These two views come into loggerheads in the cyberspace and have resulted in 
                                                 
15
 See, e.g., Li Ying, China’s Public Opinion on Internet and Impartial Judgment (June 19-20, 2004) 
(paper presented in Beijing at the Conference on China-U.S. Public Opinion and Law, Centre for 
International Communication Studies of Qinghua University, Qinghua Law School and Yale Law 
School).  The term was originally coined by then-Premier Zhao Ziyang in the 13
th
 Central Committee 
of the Communist Party (“CCCP”) of China in 1987.  
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different forms of compromise and resistance on both camps. 
 
A. Public Opinion Supervision under the Leadership of the Party   
The term “public opinion supervision” was coined by the former Premier Zhao 
Ziyang in the 13
th
 Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 1987, 
where he urged the media to report on political and Party affairs so as to achieve the 
purpose of “public opinion supervision.”16 In the address, he no longer mentioned 
the mouthpiece role of the press as in the past but highlighted three principles of the 
media: the press should exercise oversight over the work and conduct of public 
officials, inform the public of important events and reflect public debate on important 
issues.
17
  These principles were echoed by the subsequent Party Secretary Jiang 
Zemin in CCCP meetings in 1992,
18
 1996
19
 and 1997.
20
  
Despite this rosy image, “public opinion supervision” was formally defined 
under the Regulations of Internal Supervision of the Chinese Communist Party 
                                                 
16
 赵紫阳在中国共产党第十三次全国代表大会上的报告 [Zhao Ziyang, Report Delivered at the 
13th National Congress of the Communist Party of China] (October 25, 1987), available at, 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64566/65447/4526369.html. 
17
 See Judy Polumbaum, The Tribulations of China’s Journalists after a Decade of Reform, in VOICES 
OF CHINA: THE INTERPLAY OF POLITICS AND JOURNALISM 33, 42 (Chin-Chuan Lee ed., 1990). 
18
 江泽民在中国共产党第十四次全国代表大会上的报告 [Jiang Zemin, Report Delivered at the 
14th National Congress of the Communist Party of China] (October 12, 1992), available at, 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5089/5106/20010430/456648.html. 
19
 江泽民, 中共中央关于加强社会主义精神文明建设若干重要问题的决议[Jiang Zemin, On 
Resolving Serious Questions Regarding Strengthening the Construction of Socialist Spirit and Culture, 
Report Delivered at the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China] (October 10, 1996), 
available at,http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5089/5106/20010430/456601.html. 
20
 江泽民在中国共产党第十五次全国代表大会上的报告 [Jiang Zemin, Report Delivered at the 
15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China], (September 12, 1997), available at 
http://xibu.tjfsu.edu.cn/elearning/lk/15c.htm. 
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(Tentative) in 2003, to be external supervision going hand in hand with internal 
supervision of the Party.
21
 It is understood to mean supervision by the masses, 
exercised through the media.
22
 It is explicitly stated in the Study Guide that public 
opinion supervision can take place only under the leadership of the Party,
23
 a clear 
reminder to the media that they are not the “fourth estate” but a Party organ. Other 
than exposing social problems, the media should help to solve conflicts in society.
24
  
The prime concern should always be the maintenance of “social stability,”25 to assist 
the state rather than adding to its burden.
26
  The above legal rhetoric was affirmed in 
various policy directions in 2005,
27
 and has been implemented in various ways by 
local officials.   
Public opinion supervision applies equally to the Internet. It was reported that 
local governments recruited Internet commentators in 2005 to redirect public opinion 
                                                 
21
 中国共产党党内监督条例 (试行) [Regulations of Internal Supervision of the Communist Party of 
China (Tentative)] (promulgated by the Central Committee of CCP Dec. 31, 2003, effective February 
17, 2004), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-01/16/content_2467829.htm. 
Section 5 states that internal supervision within the Party must go hand in hand with external 
supervision, the latter including supervision by the media.  Under Section 33, media supervision must 
take place under the guidance of the Party so as to achieve an optimal and ideal form of public opinion 
supervision.  Immediately following, in Section 34, the media is required to adhere to Party principles 
and media professional ethics, to direct public opinion on the right course and to be aware of the social 
impact of public opinion supervision. 
22
 STUDY HANDBOOK ON THE (TENTATIVE) REGULATIONS OF INTERNAL SUPERVISION OF THE CHINESE 
COMMUNIST PARTY 75 (2004). 
23任铁缨, 认真对待和正确开展新闻舆论监督 [Ren Tieying, Treating Public Opinion Supervision 
Seriously and Correctly], in STUDY HANDBOOK ibid, at 268.. 
24
 Id. at 270-271. 
25
 Id. at 278. 
26
 Id. at 281. 
27
 See广电总局印发关于切实加强和改进广播电视舆论监督工作的要求的通知 [Notice on 
Strengthening and Improving Public Opinion Supervision], 国家广播电影电视总局 [State 
Administration of Radio, Film and Television], May 10, 2005, available at 
http://www.sarft.gov.cn/manage/publishfile/35/2926.html. 
11 
 
to the “right course” on the internet,28 with their duties to counterbalance any 
pessimistic views and to explain the government’s stance.  Of note is that these 
commentators were recruited to express their opinions in their capacities as ordinary 
citizens, rather than as government spokespeople. Clearly, in light of the above 
legislative and policy directions, the Party is calling for media restraint, and is 
determined to retain its established role as the helmsman of social reform.   
 
B. Public Opinion Monitoring by the Citizens. 
Despite the constraints implied under public opinion supervision, the public, 
reporters and academics often view it as a refreshing and positive force in China’s 
media landscape, enabling the public’s voice to be heard. 29 Some equate public 
opinion supervision to a form of media monitoring, where the media serves as an 
independent watchdog monitoring the government.
30
 Indeed, China’s investigative 
reporting has contributed significantly to exposing official corruption and social 
problems. 
Regardless of such positive appraisals, inherent in the concept of public opinion 
                                                 
28
 曹筠武, 宿迁: 引导网络舆论实践 [Cao Yunwu, Su Qian: Directing the Implementation of Public 
Opinion Supervision],南方周末 [SOUTHERN WEEKEND], May 19, 2005, at A5.  It was reported that 
Nanjing, Wushi and various cities in Jiangsu province had hired teams of online commentators to direct 
public opinion. 
29
 For a general discussion of this unprecedented freedom felt by many inside and outside China, see 
Yuezhi Zhao, Watchdogs on Party Leashes? Contexts and Implications of Investigative Journalism in 
Post-Deng China, 1 JOURNALISM STUD. 577, 594 (2000). 
30
 Ibid. 
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supervision are the conflicting and difficult relationships between the public, the 
media and the state.  Theoretically, the Party is subject to the scrutiny of the public 
and the media, while simultaneously the public and the media are subject to the 
guidance of the Party. Chin-Chuan Lee describes China’s media as having changed 
from being a Party mouthpiece to a Party publicity corporation.
31
 Rather than 
brainwashing people, the media has been assigned to resolve social conflict, to 
promote Party legitimacy and to check rising corruption at the lower levels of the 
government.
32
 Attempts by the media and the Party to articulate the exact contours of 
this relationship have led to a variety of interpretations of what “public opinion” 
means in the Chinese context.
33
  
 If public opinion refers to the simple aggregation of individual opinion,
34
 the 
monitoring that it generates could be seen as a form of consensus on social or political 
problems.  However, public opinion may be dispersed, loosely organized and not 
widely heard.  David Lynch points out that public opinion is composed not of 
“ aggregates of individuals secretly holding to their thoughts, but instead [of] people 
recognizing a problem, producing conflicting ideas about what to do, considering 
those alternatives, and trying to resolve the matter by building consensus for a line of 
                                                 
31
 Chin Chuan Lee, Servants of the State or the Market?  Media and Journalists in China, in MEDIA 
OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS: A READER 241, 246 (Jeremy Tunstall ed., 2001). 
32
 Id. 
33
 For a discussion of the ambiguity inherent in the term “public opinion,” see SLAVKO SPLICHAL, 
PUBLIC OPINION 1-52 (1999).  
34
 IBID, at 28. 
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action.”35  The logical extension of “public opinion monitoring,” then would seem to 
be monitoring by this force to prevent and redress various injustices in society.  The 
role of the media is to reflect, channel and mobilize this opinion into a voice, turning 
public problems into salient public issues and affecting the outcomes of decisions.  
The media becomes representatives and trustees of the public, translating raw public 
opinion into a collective, supervisory role.  In this view, public opinion monitoring 
could act as a powerful critique of state power because the media offers an 
entertaining spectacle, a chance to participate in this collective decision making 
process.  The Internet has enabled and facilitated the gathering of the people and the 
collection of public opinion. However, it is not hard to note that this understanding of 
public opinion supervision is very different from the Communist Party’s official 
definition. In tension with the Party’s oversight, the media and the Internet strive to 
monitor the government by channeling public opinion to contest the boundaries set by 
the ruling regime. Its tenor is adversarial, representing a critical, liberating tradition 
appealing to commonly held values.
36
   
In particular, the media and the Internet can play a powerful role in instances 
where the courts have failed to live up to their duty to administer justice, and this is 
evident in cases where judicial decisions and the fate of individuals are changed after 
                                                 
35
 DAVID LYNCH, AFTER THE PROPAGANDA STATE 24 (1999).   
36
 Id. 
14 
 
media exposure of events.  Indeed, Benjamin Liebman praises the Chinese media as 
one of the most influential actors in the legal system over the last decade.
37
  Other 
scholars regard the media as a key legal actor in the battle for access to justice,
38
 even 
though, as cases have shown, condemnation in the media may bias trials and 
undermine the independence of legal proceedings.
39
  Nonetheless, public opinion 
monitoring has become increasingly important since the late twentieth century.  
Landmark cases before the OPOW Reports in 2008 include the Sun Zhigang 
investigation,
40
 the BMW case
41
 and the Liu Yong trial.
42
  
                                                 
37
 Benjamin Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese Legal System, 105 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1 (2005). 
38
 NEIL J. DIAMANT, STANLEY LUBMAN & KEVIN J. O’BRIEN, ENGAGING THE LAW IN CHINA 10 (2005). 
39
 In one notorious case, a defendant who was sentenced to death by the court remarked bitterly that he 
was in fact sentenced and “executed” by the media.  The defendant, Zhang Jinzhu, a local public 
security official in Hunan’s Zhengzhou county, knocked down a pedestrian while driving under the 
influence of alcohol in 1997.  Without stopping, he dragged the victim with his car for about 1500 
meters and hit another pedestrian in the process.  The first victim was killed and the second suffered 
serious injury.  Zhang was sentenced to death in 1998.  He appealed, but the sentence was upheld.  
As he had been portrayed in the media as an evil monster, Zhang argued that the sentence was too 
heavy and that he in fact had been condemned by the media before the court’s sentence.  See鄢烈山, 
谁杀了公安张金柱 [Yan Lie Shan, Who Killed Police Officer Zhang Jinzhu?], Apr. 8, 2005, 
http://news.163.com/05/0408/20/1GRFCV300001120T.html. For discussion of the cases, Benjamin L. 
Liebman, Changing Media, Changing Courts, in CHANGING MEDIA CHANGING CHINA 150 (Susan L. 
Shirk, ed. 2010). 
40
 Sun Zhigang was a 27 year old graphic designer who was beaten to death on March 17, 2003 in a 
Guangzhou detention centre for migrants when he failed to produce a temporary residence permit.  
The incident was not reported by the media until more than a month after the event when the outspoken 
Southern Metropolis Daily reported the death on April 25.  Discussion spread like wildfire on the 
Internet and the Beijing Youth Daily picked up the story.  Because of the coverage, the government set 
up an investigation team.  As a result, on June 20, Premier Wen Jiabao abolished China’s Custody and 
Repatriation system.  See Dingjian Cai, The Development of Constitutionalism in the Transition of 
Chinese Society, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 11 n.33 (2005). 
41
 The BMW case occurred at the end of 2003. Su Xiuwen fatally struck a peasant in Harbin while 
driving a BMW. The issue was whether this was a case of intentional murder.  In the trial, the Court 
ruled that it was an accident.  The media covered the case widely and questioned the links between Su 
and higher officials in the region.  On appeal, the court upheld the trial judge’s decision.  Public 
opinion did not change the decision but discussion on the Internet was so heated that Party officials had 
to ban reporting of the case and ordered websites to remove coverage and discussions of the case.  See 
刘鉴强，“宝马案”疑云 [Liu Jianqiang, “BMW Case” Suspicions], 南方周末 [S. WEEKEND] Jan. 8, 
2004, at A5. 
42
 Liu Yong, a triad leader in Liaoning province, was sentenced to death on April 17, 2002.  On 
appeal, his sentence was reduced to life imprisonment.  The media questioned whether this was a fair 
decision and hinted at the personal connections between Liu and local officials.  Waves of criticism 
15 
 
 
III. Trial by Courts vs. Trial by Online Public Opinion 
A. The Judiciary 
In contrast to the privileged position of the media, the judiciary in the Chinese 
system has been assigned to assume an ambiguous role. China does not practise 
separation of power or checks and balances, but believes in “checks and supervision” 
of a socialist style under the Party.
43
 Judicial independence is not an institutionalized 
established practice.
44
 Although ruling the country according to law has been a Party 
principle, judges “fidelity to the law should… never override their loyalty to the 
principle of Party leadership.”45 
In addition, the judiciary system in China is modelled on the civil servants system 
and most judges are Party members.
46
 Since 1954, every president of the Supreme 
People’s Court has also been put in charge of the overseeing of the Party judicial 
operations.
47
 Though one of the vice presidencies of the Supreme People’s Court are 
                                                                                                                                            
came pouring in over the Internet and in the print media.  The Supreme People’s Court intervened in 
December 2003 and reinstated the death sentence.  Liu was executed within hours of the Court’s 
announcement.  See Liebman, supra note 7, at 82-91.  
43
 The phrase was introduced by the former Party General Secretary Hu Jintao in his report to the 17
th
 
National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2007.胡锦涛在中共第十七次全国代表大会上
的报告 [Hu Jintao, Report delivered at the 17th CPC National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China (15 October 2007), available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/104019/104099/6429414.html For 
further discussion on Chinese style of rule by law and “checks and supervision,” see ALBERT H.Y. 
CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 59, 65 (2011). 
44
 Chen, id., 200. 
45
 Chen, id., 200. 
46
 Anne S.Y. Cheung, Exercising Freedom of Speech behind the Great Firewall: A Study of Judges’ 
and Lawyers’ Blogs in China, HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (ONLINE), 250, 259 (2011).. 
47
 Suli Zhu, The Party and the Courts, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA 56 (2009). 
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usually held by non-Party members, these individuals are carefully selected and are 
trusted by the Party.
48
 The 2005 Civil Servant Law, which stipulated that judges are 
civil servants,
49
 means that judges have both administrative and judicial duties to 
fulfill. For instance, the Law requires all civil servants to obey and implement 
directions from their seniors unless those directions are against the law.
50
 The 
conventional image of Chinese judges is that they are “bureaucratic automatons” in 
China’s weak court system of one-party rule.51  
Yet, the judiciary is not satisfied to play a mere subservient role to the executive. 
Hualing Fu argues that, in fact, it is in the “institutional interest of the courts to assert 
judicial authority, to carve out their space and to protect it.”52 He calls for a nuanced 
understanding on judicial independence in China. Fu further points out that the degree 
of independence of the courts is dependent on the nature of the cases being heard, the 
political status of the courts, and their dependence on other government 
departments.
53
 In specific, the Party is more likely to intervene in criminal cases 
                                                 
48
 Id. 
49
 Article 3 of the Civil Servant Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted at the 15th session of 
the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on 
April 27, 2005, promulgated and came into force as of January 1, 2006), available at 
www.lawinfochina.com (last visited Apr. 26, 2010) [hereinafter Civil Servant Law]. 
50
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New Ideas, PEOPLE’S DAILY, Apr. 25, 2005, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-04/28/content_2887028.htm. 
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LAW & POL’Y 79, 84 (2010). 
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Thomas C. Heller, eds) 193, 205 (2003).  
53
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because criminals are considered to be enemies of the socialist state, threatening the 
stability of the social and political order of the Party.
54
 On top of this, the Chinese 
courts are subject to the leadership of different institutions including the Party at the 
local level, the Party through the Political and Legal Committee, the local National 
People’s congress, the Supreme People’s Procuracy and the local government.55 
Sometimes, lower courts ask superior courts for opinion so as to fend off and 
circumvent the local interference.
56
 In addition, cases can also be re-opened even 
parties have exhausted their right of appeal.
57
 In light of all the above and the 
perennial issue of corruption,
58
 the problems faced by the Chinese judiciary should 
not be underestimated. 
Fu’s observations on Chinese judiciary provide a useful point of reference to the 
present study. As discussion in the next section will show, of the 12 legal stories most 
discussed by the netizens, ten of them were criminal cases. However, rather than 
merely asking for appeal or re-retrial, five of the twelve stories were asking their 
grievances to be heard by the courts. From this perspective, the netizens have become 
assertive in bringing their disputes to courts. Despite of the many problems that beset 
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 This is under the procedure for “adjudicative supervision.” Parties may petition for re-trial before 
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supra note 43, 210. 
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 Fu considers the biggest problem of the judiciary is corruption. Fu, id., 211. For other problems that 
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the judiciary, they still have high hopes that the judicial intervention would deliver the 
kind of justice that they have longed for. After all, the courts are the official fora to 
resolve legal disputes. 
Yet, the conflicts among judicial legitimacy, the Party’s goal, and the expectation 
of the public are brought into a sharp focus in the media and Internet era. As early as 
1997, Xiao Yang, President of China’s Supreme People’s Court called upon all courts 
to put themselves under the scrutiny of the media,
59
 which was in line with the 
over-arching principle of public opinion supervision under Party’s leadership. In the 
Internet era of the 21
st
 century, this scrutiny has manifested itself in the form of online 
public opinion monitoring directly from the people. While the courts have shown 
much reservation (if not hostility) towards media scrutiny from journalists,
60
 they are 
eager to capture the public opinion to support their judgment. For instance, in 2008, 
the then President of the Supreme People’s Court, Wang Shenjun, specifically 
instructed that on the decision of handing down capital punishment, the courts had to 
consider the feelings of society and the people so as to achieve an “unified legal and 
social impact.”61 Wang was also known for his stance in encouraging the courts to 
“pursue the ‘mass line,’ to serve the needs of the people, to take public opinion into 
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60
 Liebman, supra note 7. Benjamin Liebman and Tim Wu, China’s Network Justice, 8 Chicago 
Journal of International Law 257 (2007-8). 
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account and seek to increase the level of public satisfaction with the work of the 
judiciary.”62 Regardless of his controversial position, this judicial willingness to take 
into account of public sentiment can be a catalyst for robust discussion of legal stories 
on the Internet. 
 
B. Voices in the Internet   
The power of the Internet and the netizens in China should not be underestimated. 
Since 1997, the China Internet Network Information Society (better known as CNNIC) 
has been boasting of a steady increase of Internet users in its biannual reports.
63
 The 
latest figure revealed that by the end of 2012, the number of Internet users in China 
had climbed to 564 million with a penetration rate of 42.1%.
64
 And among these 
there is the striking phenomenon of the number of microbloggers, reaching a total of 
309 million microblog users, an increase of 58.73 million (23.5%) compared with 
2011.
65
 It is also reported that 54.7%, of all Internet users were microbloggers,
66
 
meaning that one in two Internet users in China microblogged, and a large portion of 
Chinese netizens is using the Internet to share their thoughts. Although microblogging 
has been described as a form of “fast food communication” where one can write only 
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140 Chinese characters in one post, study shows that it is a powerful form of 
communication through which one can contribute easily.
67
  
The Chinese Government is fully aware of this trend. The Party views the 
Internet as a convenient social barometer tapping directly into public sentiments since 
netizens could express their opinions online. It is being described by the authorities as 
a “magnetic field for public opinions,”68 and as a forum to “understand the public and 
to gather collective wisdom”.69 In particular, the annual reports of the Office of 
Public Opinion Watch (OPOW) have included the voices from microblogs since 
2010.
70
 
The different composition of microbloggers will reveal a glimpse of how intense 
the battle to have one’s voice heard can be. Of the microblog market, more than 46% 
of about 100 million microbloggers used Sina Weibo (Microblog) in 2010, rendering 
Sina to be the most popular and most powerful microblog player.
71
 Microblog 
messages in a month amounted to 90 millions, with a daily average of about 3 
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millions, and an average of 40 messages being sent every second.
72
  
Other than individual microbloggers, the authorities and the media are eager to 
be players in the microblog world. As of October 2012, there were 60,064 microblog 
government accounts that were active on Sina Microblog, of which 34, 539 were 
opened by governments and Party organs, and 25,525 were opened by verified 
government officials.
73
 Compared with 2010, this was a drastic increase. Back then, 
there were only 41 government departments or organs that had Sina Microblog 
accounts.
74
 Interestingly, Jiangsu province and the Public Security agencies have the 
most number of government microblogs.
75
 Likewise, the media is a keen player of 
microblogs. As of August 2010, there were 466 mainstream media outlets in China 
that had Sina microblog service accounts including 118 newspapers, 243 magazines, 
36 television stations and 69 radio stations.
76
 By the end of 2011, the total number of 
microblogs opened by media outlets and by individual media workers had reached 
3,516 and 24,416 respectively, representing an increase of 10.4% and 16.7% 
respectively.
77
 
The above figures have confirmed that microblogging is a “battlefield for the war 
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of position” in the dissemination of information and ideas, and for participation.78 
Most, the different parties involved are aware how important it is to set the agenda for 
social and political discussion. The netizens have high hopes that the Internet could 
provide a platform for their voices being heard and for changes in society being made. 
As reported in 2012, one of every two Chinese netizens was a microblogger.
79
 But it 
is exactly this fervour and enthusiasm that make the authorities nervous. In the 2010 
OPOW Report, government censorship of the Internet was admitted and the need for 
public opinion supervision was reiterated.
80
 The authorities are equally keen to offer 
their version of events, to clarify “rumours,” and to counter-balance perceived 
threatening speech.
81
 Caught in between, Internet service providers have to toe a 
delicate line. Like traditional media, it has to please two masters, in not offending the 
authorities and its users. Sina corporation is known for its close relations with the 
Chinese authorities. But unlike the traditional media which can handpick their editors 
and reporters, Sina and other internet service providers need to have other means to 
ensure the right form of information content can be circulated. It is reported that Sina 
has its own censorship department with a team of a thousand staff to monitor its 
microblogs.
82
 Internet companies need to comply with various regulations in 
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censoring objectionable speech but also need to attract and keep their customers. 
As a result, the stories that ultimately reach us and manage to be headline 
Internet events are survivors of a complex system of filtering, supervision and 
counter-balancing.  
 
C. The Transformation of Legal Narratives 
In this rising tide of online dissenting voices, a noticeable feature is the advocacy 
of law and rights. Elizabeth Perry observes that there has been a steady increase of 
popular protest in China since 1989 and she remarks that these protests are often 
framed in a language of “legal rights,” giving an impression that there has been a 
“rising rights consciousness” in China.83  In the specific context of cyberspace, 
Guobin Yang has described the above oppositional voices as online social and 
political activism, with a special focus on the rights of disadvantaged groups.
84
 
 Here, in our present study of twelve legal stories that had hit the virtual headline 
news in the last five years (2008-2012), the dissenting voices were expressed clearly 
in the rhetoric of rights and legal language. They represented the common concerns of 
many in China: the disadvantaged and the ordinary citizens who are helpless in face 
of a corrupted, bureaucratic and authoritarian regime. Somehow, the netizens have put 
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83
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their faith in the judiciary, and trust that justice will be delivered if members of the 
judiciary or higher Party members are alerted. 
 In the below Table, one can tell that five out of the twelve stories were concerned 
with attempts made by netizens or the parties involved to bring the grievances to 
courts and to have lawsuits filed before courts. Two of them were non-criminal in 
nature, while the rest were criminal cases.
 85
 Only two stories were about attempts to 
overturn sentences.
86
 In total, out of the twelve stories, only the outcome of one was 
completely inconsistent with the majority of public opinion. Sadly, it was about forced 
prostitution of young girls by Party members and officials. 
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Year No. of Case 
successfully filed 
before the Court
87
 
No. of cases in which the 
outcome was fully consistent 
with prevailing public opinion
88
 
No. of cases in which 
the outcome was 
partially consistent 
with PO
89
 
No. of cases in 
which the outcome 
was inconsistent 
with PO
90
 
2008 1  1  0 0 
2009 3  1 3 1 
2010 1  0 0 0 
2011 0  1 0 0 
2012 0 0 0 0 
2013 0 3 0 1 
                                                 
87
  
(a) Xunyang County People's Procuratorate of Shaanxi Province v. Zhou Zhenglong [陕西省旬阳县
人民检察院诉周正龙] (Xunyang County People's Court of Shaanxi Province, 27 September 
2008);  
(b) Luo Caixia v. Wang Zhengrong [罗彩霞诉王峥嵘] (Xiqing District People's Court of Tianjin 
Municipality, 2009), case settled on 13 August 2010;  
(c) Zhang Hui v. Minhang District Traffic Enforcement Group of Shanghai Municipality [张晖诉上海
市闵行区城市交通行政执法大队] (Minhang District People's Court, 19 November 2009);  
(d) Chongming County People’s Procuratorate of Kunming City v. Li Dongming and Su Shaolu [昆明
市崇明县人民检察院诉李东明和苏绍录] (Chongming County People's Court, 14 August 2009);  
(e) Wangdu County People's Procuratorate of Hebei Province v. Li Qiming [河北省望都县人民检察
院诉李启铭] (Wangdu County People's Court, 30 January 2011). 
88
  
(a) People's Procuratorate of Guangzhou City v. Xu Ting [广州市人民检察院诉许霆] (Intermediate 
People's Court of Guangzhou City, 31 March 2008);  
(b) the Wang Shuai [王帅] case (Wang was placed in criminal detention by the police of Baoling City, 
Henan Province for the crime of libel after he criticized online the city government for illegal land 
takings. He was released afterwards and awarded state compensation for wrongful detention. See 
"河南副省长:王帅行为不构成诽谤罪 灵宝市将道歉并给予赔偿" Nanfang Daily, 18 April 
2009, available at <http://china.nfdaily.cn/content/2009-04/18/content_5078872.htm>, accessed 
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For the study on public opinion and a better understanding to the dynamics 
between public opinion, court decision and the desire of the netizens to bring 
grievances to courts, the below discussion focuses on four cases which surveys were 
conducted by the media or the court. 
 
(1)    Survey by CCTV: The Case of Deng Yujiao’s Defence against Rape 
The first story which caused huge uproar in the public was the Deng Yujiao trial in 
2009. Deng was a 21 years old hotel waitress who killed a government official and 
wounded another in an attempt to protect herself from rape and sexual assault in May 
2009.
91
 The story was ranked first in Internet discussion in 2009, attracting 25, 133 
posts.
92
 
Deng herself called the police right after the incident and she was detained by the 
police officers for “intentional killing.” But after investigation, the Public Security 
Bureau founded that Deng had used “excessive force” to defend herself and decided 
to prosecute her. At that point, there was heated debate on the Internet. Some netizens 
went to Deng’s county, Badong, in Hubei province to support her. One catchy 
                                                 
91
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headline on the Internet was “Everyone could be Deng Yujiao.”93 The plight and 
helplessness of Deng being victimized by government officials and the criminal 
justice process had struck a chord with many.  
When Deng was detained, the China’s Central Television (CCTV) had conducted 
an online survey, asking the netizens whether Deng’s conduct constituted lawful 
defence.
94
 CCTV’s involvement in garnering public opinion should not be 
underestimated as CCTV is the Party’s main electronic media outlet and TV station. 
In the survey, netizens were asked whether (i) Deng’s reaction constituted lawful 
defence and Deng should not be found guilty; (ii) Deng had used excessive force to 
defend herself but should not be found guilty of intentional killing; and (iii) it was 
difficult to tell, there was still room for discussion.
95
 The survey attracted nearly 
130,000 voters, with 94% supported Deng and opted for the first option of not guilty, 
with 6% opted for the second option and less than 1% opted for the last option.
96
 
Because of the Internet discussion and survey, two lawyers acted pro bono for Deng,
97
 
photos and interview of Deng in the hospital were posted on the Internet,
98
 and 
academics also joined the debate to discuss the legal merits of Deng’s defence.99 
                                                 
93
 Huang, supra note 91 at p.732. 
94
 http://news.cctv.com/special/badong/shouye/index.shtml 
95
 http://news.cctv.com/vote/see11889.shtml 
96
 Ibid. There were 129111 voters for the survey, with 93.41% opted for (i), 5.83% opted for (ii) and 
o.75% opted for (iii). 
97
 Huang, supra note 91, at p.733. 
98
 Liebman, supra note 7, 836. 
99
 A conference was held by thirty scholars in Beijing, calling on public support for Deng Yujiao. Ibid.  
28 
 
Eventually, Deng was found by the Badong County Court of using excessive force in 
defence but was exempted from any punishment because she was found to be 
suffering from psychological and mental disorder with acute depression.
100
  
This final judicial outcome of “guilty but free” was seen as a solution in response 
to the public outcry for “justice.” Although this could be seen as a half victory for 
Deng and the netizens, it is believed that Deng would have faced a different and 
worse fate if it were not for the wave of public opinion in the media and the 
Internet.
101
 At the end, the Deng case was listed by the Annual Report of the People’s 
Court of 2009 as an exemplary decision that had achieved both positive legal and 
social effects,
102
 but the authorities had been keeping a watchful eye on the 
development of public opinion throughout. It was reported in the OPOW 2009 Report 
that a microblogger nicknamed “Butcher,” who had played an important role in 
raising lawyer’s fee for Deng Yujiao, was a potential threat to society.103 The case 
was a sensational one and was listed as one of the top 20 Internet events in 2009 (and 
will be discussed further in the next section).
104
 It was further mentioned in the 
Report that Butcher was persuaded and “fended off” successfully by an officially 
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investigator netizen, “Border Citizen,” not to intervene in another legal scandal 
concerning forced prostitution on primary school students.
105
 
 
(2) Survey by Local Television Station: Hangzhou Drag Racing 70 KM Case 2009 
Another case involving survey by television station was the Hangzhou Drag 
Racing 70 Km Case of 2009. The case was ranked the seventh hottest Internet story in 
2009, attracting 7495 posts.
106
 What happened was a son of a rich local businessman 
had knocked down a recent university graduate with his Mitsubishi sports car in 
central Hangzhou.
107
 The driver, Hu Bin, was detained by the policemen but not 
arrested. On the following day, when police reported that Hu was driving 70 
kilometers per hour, a huge outburst of angry discussion took place on the Internet. 
This was because the university graduate was believed to be dead on the spot, after 
being knocked off flying five meters high and landed twenty meters away from the 
crash scene according to eye witnesses.
108
 And the photos of Hu apparently smoking 
and laughing with his friends right after the accident only added fuel to the debate.
109
 
Due to public pressure, the police issued another report two weeks later, admitting 
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their mistakes and finally revealing that Hu was driving an illegally modified sports 
car, at a speed between 84.1 to 101.2 kilometers per hour at the time of the accident. 
This incident had hit a raw nerve of many, in particular when the victim was a 
recent university graduate from a poor farmer’s family who had been studying hard 
and working on his own for a better life. Many saw it as a tragedy caused by the 
selfish generation of the new rich.
110
 They were eager to bring Hu into justice. The 
legal debate had become on what charge Hu should be prosecuted. In a television 
programme by Qilu Television of Shandong province, audience were asked to vote 
through sms messages whether Hu should be charged for causing vehicular death of 
another which carried a maximum sentence of three years, or for endangering public 
safety which carried a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
111
 It was found that 
89% of the voters (16091), voted for a heavier charge against Hu, while only 11% 
(1756) voters opted for a lenient charge.
112
 
Despite the public stance, like the Deng case, the outcome of the Hangzhou Drag 
Racing case was also a half victory. In July 2009, Hu was prosecuted for causing 
vehicular death of another under article 133 of the Criminal Code, and was sentenced 
by the court to three years of imprisonment. Both Hu’s family and the victim’s family 
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were not satisfied with the outcome.
113
 Netizens even questioned whether the 
defendant before court was the real Hu Bin.
114
 Such reaction revealed the complete 
lack of public trust with the police, the procurorate and the court. Perhaps, what the 
public furor managed to do was to force the police to carry a proper investigation of 
the case and to bring the culprit before court. Without public opinion monitoring, the 
truth of the accident might not even be revealed. 
 
( 3) Survey by People’s Daily Online to Rescue a Defamer: Wang Shuai Story 2009 
 Different from trying to pin down and punish a culprit, public opinion can also 
be used to rescue the innocent. In 2009, a young man named Wang Shuai who was 
working in Shanghai at that time posted online stories about his own family and other 
farmers who were forced out of their farmland due to industrial development without 
adequate compensation back in Lingbao county of Henan province. Because of this, 
Wang had offended the local government of Lingbao. Lingbao policemen and online 
policemen went to Shanghai to detain Wang in a Shanghai police station for three 
days, before escorting him back to Lingbao for a further detention in Lingbao police 
station for another 5 days. Later, Wang was arrested and was charged for defaming the 
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local government. 
 What was shocking to many was the cross-provincial arrest by local policemen 
for an alleged case of criminal defamation against a local government. And the fact 
that forced land requisition was a common problem to many immediately triggered a 
heated debate online.
115
 Wang story was ranked sixteenth in 2009 hottest Internet 
topic, attracting 5004 posts.
116
 Like the Deng story, many identified with Wang and 
they asked “Who would be the next Wang Shuai?”.117 
 In the meantime, People’s Daily Online, the official portal operated by People’s 
Daily (the Party press) had carried wide coverage of the story. They interviewed Wang 
and conducted a large scale online survey asking the netizens whether they believed 
that (i) defamation is a pretext for the local government to suppress free speech; (ii) 
Wang had used the improper channels to complain and had harmed the reputation of 
the government; (iii) further investigation was necessary before conclusion can be 
drawn; and (iv) other opinions. Out of the 20533 voters, 93.4% believed it was the 
local government’s attempt to suppress free speech.118 
 In the end, Wang was not prosecuted. Not only was he set free, he received a 
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compensation of RMB780 and an apology from the local government.
119
 The Internet 
and online public opinion were seen as the “mighty imperial sword” that had saved 
Wang from the barbaric act of the local government.
120
 
 
( 4 ) Survey by the Court: Xian Car Accident of “Passionate Killing” 2011 
Other than public opinion survey conducted by the media, opinion survey was 
carried out by the court in the case of Yao Jiajin. The facts were equally disturbing as 
in the Hangzhou Drag Car Racing story. It involved a traffic accident that took place 
in October 2010 in Xian, Shaanxi province, when Yao Jiajin, a university music 
student, knocked down a farmer on a motor cycle.
121
 After the victim, Zhang Miao, 
fell on the ground, Yao feared that Zhang would remember the licence plate number 
of his car, so he went up and stabbed her several times before fleeing.
122
 Although 
Yao went to the police station to confess his act three days later,
123
 there was a 
continuous outpour of public anger till Yao was tried and executed in 2011. The Yao 
case was ranked the top seventh Internet story in 2011, attracting more than four 
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million posts.
124
  
Similar to the Drag Car Racing case, netizens viewed Yao case as a battle 
between the privileged powerful and the meek. Yao’s father was a former senior 
military officer but the victim was a farmer and a young mother with a two year old 
child.
125
 The netizens framed the battle as “Yao Jiajin and the Law, Yao Jiajin and 
China, only one can live!”126 When there was suggestion by academics that Yao 
killed out of “in a heat of passion,” the netizens were outraged.127 
Perhaps, what was most surprising was that Xian Intermediate People’s Court 
had distributed survey to the five hundred people who were present in the murder trial, 
seeking their opinions on how Yao should be punished and their suggestions on the 
case.
128
 It was reported that out of the 500 present, four hundred were university 
students while only about 25 were farmers.
129
 However, it was hard to tell how and 
whether the survey had influenced the final outcome of the case as the result of the 
survey was not disclosed. The final outcome of the case was that Yao was convicted 
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of murder in trial in 2011.
130
 The defence of killing out of passion or that he was 
provoked was not accepted by the court. Yao’s sentence remained unchanged on 
appeal.
131
 
 The above method of collecting public opinion by the court during trial was 
also seen as controversial in China,
132
 but the Xian Intermediate People’s Court 
defended its action as being consistent with a policy since 2008 of being open, 
transparent and in touch with the public life.
133
 Most, it mentioned that the judge’s 
behaviour should be under the supervision of the public.
134
 Indeed, in the 2008 Policy 
Guideline for all courts in Shaanxi province, article 2 requires the court to seek the 
opinion of those present in cases with great social impact and those that involved 
public interest.
135
 
 
The Solicitation of Public Opinion 
The above four legal stories which had captured the attention of the public and 
the authorities did not turn out to be full victory on every occasion. Although culprits 
were punished and victims were free, compromises were also made. For instance, 
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Deng was free but was considered as “mad;” while Hu who killed a university 
graduate with his race car was sentenced to a lighter sentence of three years. At the 
other end, Yao was executed for knocking down a victim with his car and stabbing her 
to death; and Wang was rescued from facing a criminal trial. All these are possible 
only with the help of public opinion, which traditional media and the Internet have 
played a definitive role in giving support and in amplifying the voices. If media 
involvement represents supervision by the authorities, what makes the Internet to be 
arguably distinguishable is that both the ruler and the ruled are adamant to gain the 
upper hand in this new terrain.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 The essence of victimhood in all the legal stories covered in this Internet study is 
injustice. If it is not for the outpouring of public opinion, the victims’ stories would be 
silenced. Deng’s defence of rape would be denied credibility; the truth of the car 
accidents in Hangzhou and Xian would be secreted away; and Wang’s plight of 
requisition would have landed him in prison. Yet the injury inflicted is not only to the 
victims concerned but is a collective harm to society as a whole. The netizens are 
compelled to voice out as they see themselves being the potential victims in each 
story. 
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 And the Internet has lent voice to the public opinion, allowing it to be expressed 
directly. Through public opinion, citizen awareness of issues is mobilized to act as a 
check against the state, to influence court decisions, or to push for legislative or policy 
reforms. It becomes a constant struggle to articulate the fear and concerns in ordinary 
life, to establish new rules on what is permissible to say, and to define justice. At 
times, netizens act to restore justice and take on the jury role to re-shape social and 
legal order. But this cry for justice needs the assistance of law and the court for only 
the latter are the emblems of power and official authority. Injustice must be 
acknowledged and addressed openly in the court. Indeed, Perry reckons the long 
tradition of Chinese citizens of seeking help from the courts in imperial time and in 
authoritarian regime.
136
 Only when such failed, large scale protests might break out. 
In light of this, Perry describes Chinese citizens to be largely “rule conscious,” rather 
than being “right conscious” for they have long adhered to state-approved 
discourse.
137
 
 In this sense, the Chinese court plays a critical role not only in resolving social 
conflicts and legal disputes, but also in softening oppositional voices, and in soothing 
the rising discontent in society. As the common dictum says, justice must not only be 
done but must be seen to be done. When the judiciary conducts public opinion survey, 
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or refers to such, they are also giving voice to the suppressed, and lending strength to 
society’s self-healing impulse. It gives hope to the public when the judiciary responds 
to public sentiment. But the Chinese judiciary can only do it in a cautionary way for 
all the institutional constraints that define it. Perhaps, to a certain extent, public 
opinion has lent also legitimacy to the Court’s own decision and position. 
 For now, with the Internet and the power of microblogs, public opinion 
monitoring can come direct from the citizens, forcing at least a daily relationship of 
direct engagement with the authorities, training the judiciary and the authorities to be 
attentive to the monitoring power. Regardless of the risk that such monitoring will be 
supervised, the Web and its promise of a voice and a site for all has become the 
unknown sea that lures travelers of different kinds with the temptation of discovery 
and conquest.
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Appendix 
Year Case Case was filed before court/ 
successfully prosecuted  
The outcome of the trial was 
fully consistent with PO 
The outcome of the trial was 
partially consistent with PO 
The outcome of the trial was 
inconsistent with PO 
2013 Teenager Li X 
involved in raping a 
barmaid 
 1   
2013 Gong Aiai  1   
2013 Sexual Assaults of 
Schoolgirls by a 
Headmaster 
 1   
2013 Xia Junfeng    1 
2011 Yao Jiajin  1    
2010 Li Gang 1    
2009 Deng Yujiao   1   
2009 Hide and Seek 1    
2009 Shanghai “Fishing” 
Law Enforcement Case 
1    
2009 Hangzhou Drag Car 
Racing 70KM 
  1  
2009 Prostitution of Primary 
School Students 
   1 
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2009 Wang shuai  1   
2009 Xishui Underage 
Prostitution 
  1  
2009 Luo Caixia 1    
2008 Huanan Tiger Story 1    
2008 Xu Ting ATM  1?   
Total 16 5 6 3  2 
 
